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I. Introduction
One of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s most fascinating and controversial pro-
posals is his eschatological ontology. The concept of “totality” plays a cen-
tral role in this ontology. All things are what they are only by virtue of their
participation in the totality of reality. For Pannenberg, reality is temporal
and historical, and thus the end of the temporal process assumes great
importance in his ontology. It is only at the end of history that the totality
is revealed. Only at the end is the true nature of things decided.
This eschatological ontology has been implicit in much of Pannen-
berg’s work since the 1960s.2 The conception was already developed in a
preliminary way in the programmatic essay on “Theology and the King-
dom of God” (1967),3 and it was articulated in much greater detail
throughout the three volumes of the Systematic Theology (1988–93).4 But
Pannenberg’s most refined treatment of this ontology is offered in his
important but often neglected 1988 work, Metaphysics and the Idea of
God.5
Pannenberg’s conception of eschatological totality has been subjected
to sharp critique. In particular, Niels Henrik Gregersen has argued that
Pannenberg’s ontology undermines the relationship between God and the
1 I am grateful for discussions of this material with Christiaan Mostert, LeRon Shults and Byron
Smith, and for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 Philip Clayton, “The God of History and the Presence of the Future,” in The Journal of Reli-
gion 65 (1985), 105, rightly notes that the ontology of the future underlies Pannenberg’s whole
understanding of God, history and divine action. The fullest and most perceptive discussion of
this aspect of Pannenberg’s work is Christiaan Mostert, God and the Future: Wolfhart Pan-
nenberg’s Eschatological Doctrine of God (London: continuum, 2002), chapters 3–5.
3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Theology and the Kingdom of God,” in Theology and the Kingdom
of God, ed. by Richard John Neuhaus (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 51–71.
4 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., transl. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991–98).
5 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysik und Gottesgedanke (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1988);
English translation: Metaphysics and the Idea of God, transl. by Philip Clayton (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990). The English edition includes two further essays (chapters 7–8)
which are not in the German edition. Except in the case of these final two chapters, references
to this work give the page number in the English edition followed by the page number of the
German edition in parentheses.
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particularities of creaturely existence, while Brian Walsh and James K. A.
Smith have argued that Pannenberg presents a monistic totality which ulti-
mately eliminates all creaturely differences. According to such criticisms,
Pannenberg views temporal finitude only as something which must be over-
come by the infinite; in this way, Pannenberg does violence to difference it-
self, and calls in question the intrinsic goodness of the created order. In the
discussion that follows, I will explore these lines of criticism, and I will
engage with David Bentley Hart’s recent ontological proposal as a particu-
larly sharp and sophisticated form of such critique. With Hart, I accept as
a basic ontological axiom the judgment of Emmanuel Levinas that “being”
consists in “multiplicity”, so that being “refuses totalization but takes form
as fraternity and discourse”.6
My aim here is to offer a defence of Pannenberg, and I will do so by
attending to Pannenberg’s own depiction of the relationship between total-
ity and difference, especially as presented in Metaphysics and the Idea of
God. In Pannenberg’s view, I will argue, the eschatological totality func-
tions in such a way that difference is preserved as difference within the
structure of a coherent semantic whole. To clarify further this conception
of totality and difference, I will suggest that Robert W. Jenson’s model of
the narrative structure of the eschatological consummation provides a
highly illuminating analogy of Pannenberg’s entire ontological proposal. 
II. Future and Totality
In Metaphysics and the Idea of God, Pannenberg follows Plotinus in
emphasising “a primacy of the future for the understanding of time”.7 The
particularities of temporal existence can be grasped only in their relation to
the totality of existence, and, in turn, “the totality of existence [die Ganz-
heit des Daseins] is possible only from the standpoint of its future”,8 since
it is only the future which finally decides the true nature of a thing. Pan-
nenberg illustrates this point with Dilthey’s statement that “one would
have to wait for the end of history in order to possess complete material for
determining the meaning of history”.9 Pannenberg therefore argues that
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6 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, transl. by Alphonso Lin-
gis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 216.
7 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 77 (57).
8 Ibid., 78 (58). On Pannenberg’s view of totality, see F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundatio-
nalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 142–53.
9 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 85–86 n. 40 (97 n. 14); citing Wilhelm Dil-
they, Gesammelte Schriften, 16 vols. in 18 (Leipzig/Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1914–72),
7 : 233.
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future and wholeness “belong together”.10 Only the future can bring com-
pletion and wholeness to finite being, and thus the future is primary over
both past and present. Indeed, for Pannenberg, the past and present are sig-
nificant precisely by virtue of their relation to the future – that is, by virtue
of their participation in the future totality.11 It is the future, understood as
a total context of meaning, that “interprets the present and the past”.12
If the future is primary in this way, then it also follows that the true
essence or identity of a thing is decided only by its future: “its essence
[Wesen], and thus its ‘what it is’ [Wassein], are determined by its future”.13
Pannenberg offers this as a new formulation of the notion of “substance”:
it is the outcome of the temporal process that determines “the whatness
[Wassein] of things”.14 Thus things are what they are “retroactively from
the outcome of their becoming”.15
This further implies that all being is (as Heidegger also perceived) a
being-in-time. “[T]he essence of life as a whole is temporal; it depends
upon whatever future it is whose coming will bring about the wholeness of
this whole.”16 After all, both our knowledge and the identity of things
themselves “are not yet completely present in the process of time”.17 The
true nature of a thing, then, is the whole temporal process of its existence,
and this process will be completed only in the future. Pannenberg thus goes
on to argue that every being should be conceived as the antizipation of its
essence, i.e., the anticipation of what it will fully be only in the future. A
thing “is what it is always in anticipation of its end and from its end”.18 In
sum, therefore, the future is the source of a being’s wholeness, and its being
is the anticipation of its future. 
Crucially, Pannenberg also suggests that the nature of this always-anti-
cipated future is in fact the eternity of God. The future which brings whole-
ness to human existence is eternity: we have “being” only to extent that we
participate anticipatorily in eternity. All created life, therefore, “is to be
understood as a form of participation in the divine eternity”.19 The tempo-
ral existence of any creature is an anticipation of that creature’s final
wholeness which is expected from the future of God’s eternity.20 Pannen-
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10 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 86 (62).
11 Ibid., 87 (63).
12 Pannenberg, “Theology and the Kingdom of God” (see above, n. 3), 60.
13 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 87 (63).
14 Ibid., 107 (78).
15 Ibid., cf. the earlier formulation of this concept in Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Future and
Unity,” in Hope and the Future of Man, ed. by Ewert H. Cousins (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1972), 72.
16 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 87 (63).
17 Ibid., 104 (76).
18 Ibid., 88 (64).
19 Ibid., 97 (70).
20 Ibid.
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berg thus offers an important theological correction of Heidegger. While
Heidegger had conceived of death as that which brings human existence to
its completion, Pannenberg argues that, on the contrary, existence is “much
more broken up, fragmented, by death”.21 What is needed, then, is a unify-
ing event that lies beyond death – and this is the eternity of God. “Only a
future of our lives’ completion […] beyond death can actualise this totality
that will manifest the identity of our existence”; and “only participation in
the eternity of God can overcome the disintegration of human life into
moments that are sundered by the march of time”, so that such moments
are “integrate[d]” into “unity and totality”.22 It is not death, therefore, but
the eternal presence of God which brings completion to the temporal pro-
cess of a creature’s existence and thus determines the true being of that
creature. The creature’s being here and now is only a participation in this
future determination of what it really is. 
This emphasis on anticipation does not, however, mean that “being”
is somehow postponed until the future consummation. On the contrary,
Pannenberg argues that the future affects the entire temporal process retro-
actively: “The decision concerning the being that stands at the end of the
process has retroactive power [rückwirkende Kraft]”.23 Pannenberg eluci-
dates this important point with a botanical example:
A zinnia is already a zinnia as a cutting and remains one during the entire process of its
growth up to blossoming, even though the flower bears its name on account of its blossom. If
there were only a single such flower, we could not determine its nature in advance; and yet over
the period of its growth it would still be what it revealed itself to be at the end. It would possess
its essence through anticipation, though only at the end of the developmental process would one
be able to know that this was its essence.24
There is thus a “retroactive causality” which the goal or telos of a
thing exerts on the whole course of temporal becoming, since “the telos is
at the same time the reality of the thing”.25 This emphasis makes it clear
that Pannenberg is not merely presenting a process ontology of temporal
development and becoming. Indeed, already in his essay on “Theology and
the Kingdom of God”, Pannenberg had agreed with A. N. Whitehead’s
view that “the movement of time contributes to deciding what the definite
truth is going to be,” but he had proceeded to offer an important clarifica-
tion: “But – and here is the difference from Whitehead – what turns out to
be true in the future will then be evident as having been true all along”.26
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21 Ibid., 86 (62).
22 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (see above, n. 4), 3 : 601.
23 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 105 (76).
24 Ibid., 105 (76).
25 Ibid., 106 (77).
26 Pannenberg, “Theology and the Kingdom of God” (see above n. 3), 62–63. For Pannen-
berg’s mature critique of process philosophy, see especially Metaphysics (see above, n. 5),
71–73, 113–29 (53–55, 80–91).
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Just as the zinnia really does participate in its essence throughout the whole
course of its growth even though its essence is decided only at the end of the
process, so too all creatures participate in their being through the retroac-
tive causality of the future. 
In sum, Pannenberg offers an ontology of the future in which the true
nature of things is determined solely by the outcome of history, by the
unifying event in which finite existence is gathered up into a single, cohe-
rent totality. In the words of Christiaan Mostert, Pannenberg’s concern is
to develop a concept of “final coherence” in which the whole of reality
appears as “a totality of meaning”.27 Creatures within the temporal pro-
cess of finite becoming participate in their being in so far as they anticipate
their final outcome. And this final outcome is, in a word, eternity. It is the
event of God’s own infinite life, the event of perfect unity and integration.
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of this ambitious pro-
posal, both as a contribution to the tradition of Western metaphysics and
as a radical attempt to orient Christian theology around the apocalyptic
message of Jesus of Nazareth and the apocalyptically-interpreted event of
Jesus’ resurrection from the dead.28 But Pannenberg’s proposal has met
with serious criticisms, to which we must now turn. In particular, we must
ask whether Pannenberg’s eschatological ontology leaves room for the con-
tinuing significance of creaturely difference, or whether difference is ulti-
mately erased by the triumph of eschatological totality.
III. Totality as Tyranny
The criticism that Pannenberg’s conception of totality undermines
creaturely difference has been expressed by several writers. In an influential
essay,29 Brian Walsh has presented Pannenberg’s ontology as a monism in
which there is first a “differentiating oneness” and then a subsequent trans-
cendence of this differentiation.30 All history is thus the movement of the
infinite “in the collapse and overcoming of the finite”.31 Since the future
has priority over the present, finitude must be overcome “precisely because
it is present” rather than future.32 Salvation itself, therefore, is nothing
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27 Mostert (see above, n. 2), 78.
28 The fact that Pannenberg’s mature ontology is rooted in his earlier preoccupation with the
resurrection of Jesus as an apocalyptic event is clear in “Theology and the Kingdom of God”
(see above, n. 3), 51–71, and above all in his work on christological method: Wolfhart Pan-
nenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1964).
29 Brian J. Walsh, “Pannenberg’s Eschatological Ontology,” in Christian Scholar’s Review 11
(1982), 229–49.
30 Ibid., 245.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 243.
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other than “release from finitude”;33 it is the moment in which “the finite
loses its finitude”.34 Although Walsh acknowledges that Pannenberg at-
tempts to affirm differentiation, he argues that “in the end the infinite
always invalidates the finite”.35 On this reading, Pannenberg’s whole sys-
tem views finitude only as an evil to be transcended and overcome. 
In a profound analysis of Pannenberg’s doctrine of creation,36 Niels
Henrik Gregersen has also argued that Pannenberg’s ontology threatens
temporal difference. Gregersen acknowledges that Pannenberg’s doctrine
of the Trinity places emphasis on God’s own “differenzierte Einheit-in-der-
Vielfalt”,37 and he observes that on the basis of this trinitarian conception
Pannenberg makes it possible to view the world both in its unity and its dif-
ferentiation, “sowohl als Einheit als auch als eine bunte Vielfalt”.38 Never-
theless, he criticises Pannenberg’s appropriation of Plotinus, noting that the
Plotinian concept of eternity “[ist] für das gesamte Spätwerk Pannenbergs
maßgebend geworden”.39 Admittedly, the positive aspect of this Plotinian
concept is that it overcomes the opposition between eternity and time, since
“Ewigkeit wird nicht als Zeitlosigkeit verstanden, sondern als die Fülle von
verschiedenen Zeiten (Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft) in dem
gleichzeitigen Zusammenklang aller Zeiten in der Ewigkeit”.40 Eternity is
thus understood both “als das Zeitübergreifende und als das Zeitumschlie-
ßende”.41 But Gregersen argues that the religious consequences of this view
are nevertheless fatal, since the eternal God is now elevated completely
beyond the fragmented differences of our temporal creaturely existence.42
Pannenberg’s ontology thus implies “daß Gott die Menschen eigentlich
nicht als Menschen verstehen könnte”, in as much as God is removed from
the sphere of human existence in its fragmentation, incompleteness and
temporal limitation.43 Gregersen therefore suggests that the Plotinian con-
cept of a totalising eternity can be appropriated only at a high theological
price44 – at the price of God’s own personal involvement with the relative
and differentiated temporal existence of the created world.
More recently, James K. A. Smith has also subjected Pannenberg’s
conception of totality to a searching critique. Smith’s central claim is that
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33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 249.
35 Ibid., 248.
36 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Einheit und Vielfalt der schöpferischen Werke Gottes: Wolfhart
Pannenbergs Beitrag zu einer trinitarischen Schöpfungslehre,” in KuD 45 (1999), 102–29.
37 Ibid., 124.
38 Ibid., 127.
39 Ibid., 124.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 125.
43 Ibid., 124.
44 Ibid., 125.
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Pannenberg’s system “devours difference”.45 Pannenberg conceives of a
timeless eternity “beyond finitude and provisionality”, a future totality in
which all finite differences are erased.46 In the end, “it is unity that over-
comes the evil of diversity and multiplicity found in creation”.47 Pannen-
berg’s whole theology is thus driven towards “suprahumanity” and the
“transcendence of finitude”.48 In this conception, Smith argues, “human
life as finite is insufficient and must be overcome”.49 But such a devaluing
of our temporal finitude necessarily entails both “a devaluing of human
being” as such, and “a depreciation of the creational life that has been
granted to us by the Creator”.50 Smith therefore pointedly asks: “is [Pan-
nenberg’s] future not a rather in-human notion?”51 According to this read-
ing, then, Pannenberg’s ontology of the future is fundamentally a system of
violence. Difference, particularity and multiplicity are merely evils to be
overcome at last in the timeless eternity of the future. Smith locates the
source of all this in Pannenberg’s doctrine of creation. For Pannenberg,
creation is already “something of a fall, a lapse into temporality and fini-
tude”, so that the creature qua created being must be redeemed, completed
and submerged in the totality of the future.52 Whether or not this is an ac-
curate reading of Pannenberg, Smith is surely right to highlight the funda-
mental importance of creaturely finitude, difference and multiplicity – and
to that extent, his critique of Pannenberg should be taken seriously.
Although David Bentley Hart does not engage explicitly with Pannen-
berg in his magisterial work on The Beauty of the Infinite,53 we may never-
theless draw Hart into the discussion at this point, since his work presents
a uniquely sustained and sophisticated critique of the concept of ontologi-
cal totality. Opposing the beauty of difference to “the tyranny of the uni-
versal”,54 Hart argues that Christian theology must “subvert every pre-
sumptuous discourse that would strive to put an end to the deferrals of
difference”.55 For Hart, the goodness of God’s creation lies precisely in its
plurality and difference, in its “intervals and instances of beauty”.56 The
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45 James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational
Hermeneutic (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 65.
46 Ibid., 76.
47 Ibid., 66.
48 Ibid., 76.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 75.
52 Ibid., 70.
53 David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).
54 Ibid., 399.
55 Ibid., 410.
56 Ibid., 258.
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significance of creation does not lie in any deeper unity underlying the dif-
ference and plurality which appear on the surface of things. Creation is not
“a text that conceals a more fundamental set of abstract meanings, to
which all its particularities can be reduced”.57 On the contrary, creation’s
glory is precisely its “surface”, precisely the distance between different
things in their own uniqueness and particularity. In the gift of creation,
God bestows genuine otherness on the creature, so that “distance is given
and sustained”, a distance “that allows the other to be truly and irreducib-
ly other”.58
Further, Hart argues that the differences of all created beings are
grounded in God’s own infinite difference and otherness. God is himself
“the distance of all things”,59 and the whole created world in all its irre-
ducible diversity thus expresses “the dynamism and differentiation that
God is”.60 While Pannenberg looks favourably on the ontology of Ploti-
nus,61 Hart critiques Plotinus’ conception of the Nous as the unifying simi-
larity of all things. In contrast to such a totalising ontology, Hart insists
that God’s Logos contains “the whole rhetoric, the entire display, of infini-
tely many differences”.62 God therefore not only affirms distance and dif-
ference; he is himself the difference between creator and creature and be-
tween all individual creatures. God is “the distance, the interval, between
God and creation”, and his own infinite otherness comprehends all crea-
turely differences.63
From within this framework, Hart thus conceives of reconciliation not
as the sublation of difference but as the liberation of each particular thing
to the “surface” of being, so that each thing is set free to be itself in its own
proper otherness. In bringing salvation to the world, God thus overcomes
every totality and affirms the goodness of difference: “Because being’s dif-
ferences are affirmed in their particularity, because God elects just these dif-
ferences, and delights in them, he does not merely consign difference to fate
[…], but also acts to liberate what he made from sin and death: this is his
infinite ‘it is good.’”64 The eschatological consummation, too, will consist
precisely in the perfected harmony of difference. The music of creation,
Hart says, will be restored “not as a totality”, but as a pure harmony in
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57 Ibid., 282.
58 Ibid., 267.
59 Ibid., 338.
60 Ibid., 192.
61 See especially Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 76–82, 90 (56–60, 65); and
Systematic Theology (see above, n. 4), 1: 403–4.
62 Hart (see above, n. 53), 296.
63 Ibid., 314.
64 Ibid., 272.
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which all tonal discords are finally reconciled.65 This eschatological harmo-
ny is achieved through “innumerable […] reconciliations” as each particu-
lar thing is liberated to be itself in perfect difference from all other things.66
Hart therefore speaks of the eschatological kingdom as “the beautiful ‘sur-
facing’ of being, the endless liberation of difference into the light”.67 The
infinity of God overcomes every totality, every violence against difference,
so that, in the end, the work of reconciliation is not a sublation but a sym-
phony.68
While Hart does not critique Pannenberg explicitly, his vision of the
goodness of otherness and of the triumph of infinite difference over onto-
logical totality provides a sharp lens through which to view Pannenberg’s
own depiction of reality as eschatological totality. Does Pannenberg in fact
construct what Timothy Bradshaw calls “a new idealist type of monism”?69
Is his project merely another instance of metaphysical violence, in which
difference is finally eliminated in the pursuit of an undifferentiated whole?
Does he fail to take seriously enough the “surface” of things, the goodness
of sheer otherness and particularity? Does his conception of the eternity of
God finally do away with the difference – and thus the goodness – of crea-
turely being? 
Such questions pose a serious challenge to Pannenberg’s project. In the
next sections, I will try to respond to this challenge by suggesting that Pan-
nenberg does in fact give due emphasis to finite difference and particulari-
ty, and that the fundamental aim of his ontology is to correlate both total-
ity and difference within a vision of the world’s eschatological future.
IV. Totality and Difference
While critics like Gregersen, Walsh and Smith have rightly highlighted
Pannenberg’s emphasis on reality as a unified totality, it should be noted
that Pannenberg consistently attempts to articulate the differentiated nature
of this totality. The category of the whole, he argues, is concerned precise-
ly with “what is individual”.70 As Mostert notes, Pannenberg’s “funda-
mental ontological vision” is thus not of a totality that eliminates differ-
ence, but of “a differentiated totality”.71
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65 Ibid., 281.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 400.
68 Ibid., 401.
69 Timothy Bradshaw, Trinity and Ontology: A Comparative Study of the Theologies of Karl
Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), 272.
70 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 138.
71 Mostert (see above, n. 2), 88.
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In his analysis of the concept of the whole, Pannenberg writes: 
[E]very individual appearance occurs within a context which itself is unique, and which
itself forms (in a certain sense) a whole in which the individual appearance has a specific,
unexchangeable place. For precisely this reason, each appearance is part of such a whole.72
The whole, then, is not the antithesis of the particular. Rather, it is the
context of the whole that endows each individual thing with its own
“unexchangeable” particularity. On the other hand, the whole is itself rea-
lised only in and through such particularities. Pannenberg critiques Hei-
degger on exactly this score: Heidegger, he observes, fails to develop a pro-
perly differentiated account of the whole. In contrast, Pannenberg argues
that “[t]he whole has definiteness only in the particular”.73 The whole is
not the elimination or Hegelian sublation (Aufhebung)74 of difference,
then, but rather that which takes place in difference itself. Pannenberg the-
refore thinks that Dilthey is closer than Heidegger to the truth, since
Dilthey recognises that “[w]e ‘have’ the whole of life, its total meaning,
only in the individual and the specific, in which the whole manifests it-
self”.75
The particular is thus the locus of the whole; difference is the locus of
totality. This means that, for Pannenberg, there can be no question of the
ultimate elimination of difference in totality, since the elimination of the
particular would, eo ipso, be the elimination of the whole. Pannenberg’s
concern, rather, is to articulate the unity between the particular and the
whole. This unity, he says, is God – or, to be more precise, God is “the
unifying unity” in which both part and whole and properly related.76 God
is himself a “differentiated structure”; he is not the anthesis of difference or
an ontological monad, for he always already contains difference within
himself, a difference which typifies analogically the relatedness of part and
whole.77
Hence just as Hart grounds creaturely difference in the infinite differ-
ence of God’s life, so too, for Pannenberg, all differentiation is grounded in
the unity-in-distinction of the trinitarian persons. For this reason, Pannen-
berg can affirm all creatures’ eschatological participation in God without
thereby undermining the particularity of each individual creature and the
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72 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 138.
73 Ibid., 161.
74 Aufhebung does, however, play an important methodological role in Pannenberg’s thought.
See Juan A. Martinez-Camino, “Aufhebung: Zur Architektur des ersten Bandes der Syste-
matischen Theologie Wolfhart Pannenbergs,” in KuD 45 (1999), 91–101; and Shults (see
above, n. 8), 159–235, especially 176–77, on the difference between Pannenberg’s and Hegel’s
methods of sublation.
75 Pannenberg, Metaphysics (see above, n. 5), 163.
76 Ibid., 143.
77 Ibid., 144.
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proper distinction between each thing and God. Participation in God, he
writes, is not a “violation of the distinction between God and creature”;78
rather, the finitude of creatures and “their distinction from God and one
another” will also continue in the eschatological consummation.79 Thus
each individual creature is “preserved in its eschatological consummation
before God”; it is “not swallowed up by the presence of God”,80 but, on
the contrary, the eschatological totality of reality is manifest precisely in the
particularity of each individual. The final appearance of the totality is the-
refore also the definitive appearance of the differentiations of all finite
being. Differences are not dissolved in totality, but are integrated so that
they find their proper place both as differences and as instances of the total-
ity of reality. In Pannenberg’s words:
Not only the individualities of creaturely reality but even the differences of moments of
time […] are not erased, but are no longer seen apart. God is the future of the finite from which
it again receives its existence as a whole.81
One might describe this not as the erasure of temporal finitude, but as
the actualisation of the finite, as the bringing of finitude to its full potential,
so that all created reality at last receives from God “its true and definitive
identity”.82
V. Narrative Totality: Pannenberg and Robert W. Jenson
The claim that Pannenberg’s ontology “devours difference”83 must
therefore be regarded as a strong misreading. I believe Pannenberg’s under-
standing of totality and difference can be clarified further if we draw an
analogy between his eschatological ontology and Robert W. Jenson’s
model of the narrative structure of the relationship between difference and
totality. For Jenson, the ordering of a narrative is established by “the out-
come of the narrated events”; the end of the narrative endows each parti-
cular moment of the preceding sequence with its own proper reality and
contingency.84 In this way, a narrative “closure” brings wholeness and in-
tegrity to the entire sequence of events; the temporal process is a single,
coherent creation since “its closure makes it a whole”.85 From the perspec-
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78 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (see above, n. 4), 2 : 33.
79 Ibid., 2 : 95.
80 Ibid., 3 : 555.
81 Ibid., 3 : 607.
82 Ibid., 3 : 603.
83 Smith (see above, n. 45), 65.
84 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997–99), 1:159.
85 Ibid., 2 : 336.
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tive of this narrative model, Jenson thus regards the future as “ontological-
ly prior to the present”.86 There is, in turn, a certain fittingness to the whole
narrative of reality, a “dramatic appropriateness” that gives coherence and
continuity to the whole.87 But this narrative fittingness is grounded not in
the temporal sequence itself but rather in the end of the sequence: only
from the future can the proper shape or fittingness of the whole be discern-
ed.88 In depicting all reality as a temporal process which receives its unity
retroactively from its final “closure”, Jenson thus emphasises the narrative
character of this unity: reality is unified eschatologically in the way that a
play is unified by its final act or a novel by its denouement. Such integrat-
ing closure is, in other words, a temporal conclusion which stands in a rela-
tionship of narrative fittingness to the entire preceding temporal process. 
If Jenson’s dramatic-narrative model is employed as an analogy of
Pannenberg’s ontology, it becomes clear that the eschatological totality
should be regarded not as a moment of static unification, but rather as a
semantic context89 which establishes the particularity of each part of the
temporal process and endows each part with its own distinct meaning. Pan-
nenberg himself has described such a semantic context as a horizon of
meaning “within which it becomes possible to determine the particular by
distinguishing it from others”.90 One might say, then, that the continuity of
the whole sequence of temporal events is established from the end of reali-
ty’s narrative, and in this way each unique particularity receives its proper
distinctiveness retroactively within the context of the total narrative.91 As
Jenson puts it, each particular temporal event is therefore contingent – it
has “the capacity to surprise” – even though, after the event, the whole
temporal sequence “displays a coherent dramatic sense that has been tight-
ened by that very event”.92
Further, while Pannenberg’s ontology has at times been characterised
as a determinism from the future93 or even as a kind of Calvinism in re-
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verse,94 Jenson’s model of dramatic cohesion clarifies the non-deterministic
relationship between creation and eschaton, nature and grace. There is a
narrative fittingness between created reality itself and the eschatological
consummation, but this is a contingent fittingness established only at the
end of the temporal sequence. The conclusion to created reality is not sim-
ply latent within the creation itself, nor is this consummation (from the
creature’s perspective) the only possible or necessary conclusion to the tem-
poral process. Rather, the eschatological consummation is strictly non-
necessary – or better, to borrow Eberhard Jüngel’s term, it is “more than
necessary” (mehr als notwendig).95 It is the contingent arrival of a genuine
novum from the future, a novum which contextualises the entire preceding
sequence of temporal events.
Thus the unifying event of narrative “closure” establishes a specific
contingent coordination between the pluralities of finite existence. Such
pluralities are integrated not by an overcoming or sublation of their differ-
ences, but precisely by their proper relatedness to one another within a
coherent semantic context. In Jenson’s terms, therefore, one could describe
Pannenberg’s totality as a narrative totality. Just as the whole narrative
sequence in certain novels is contextualised and integrated by the denoue-
ment, so too the differences of finite reality are integrated within the mean-
ing-giving context of the eschatological totality. Strikingly, Hart himself
uses a similar narrative model to articulate his ontology of difference: God
brings salvation, he says, “by electing one story as the truth of the
world”,96 and this means that “[t]o redeem each thing is to integrate it into
the story of God’s peace”.97
Such a model of narrative totality is very close to what Pannenberg
had in view even in his early essay on “Theology and the Kingdom of
God”, where he argued that “unity acquires identity by exhibiting some
meaningful connection in the sequence of events”.98 Here, the relation be-
tween totality and difference is clearly articulated: the eschatological con-
clusion does not unify reality in spite of difference – it unifies reality preci-
sely in the event of the contextualising of difference. And from this per-
spective, difference is not undermined but rather established in the moment
of integration, since only at this point is the relationship (and thus the dif-
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ferentiation) between all individual parts of reality fully established. In
theological terms: God is himself the ground of creaturely plurality, and
God secures this plurality once and for all in the eschatological consum-
mation of reality. 
In the same early essay, Pannenberg expressed this crucial point by
invoking the theological theme of the love of God. Because God the creator
is love, “he separates another being from himself while still keeping it alive
by maintaining its relation to himself”.99 The ground of the creature’s dif-
ference and finitude, therefore, is God himself. Thus Niels Henrik Greger-
sen’s critique of Pannenberg100 fails at precisely this point, since, for Pan-
nenberg, God is not an abstract Plotinian principle of totality, but he is the
God who establishes his creatures in love. God’s power – die Macht der
Zukunft! – is the power of love which grants authentic differentiated exis-
tence to all God’s creatures.
VI. Conclusion
While some critics have regarded Pannenberg’s eschatological totality
as an ontological tyranny, it is clear that Pannenberg is in fact concerned
not only with totality but also with creaturely differentiation. While Pan-
nenberg’s critics have at times assumed an irreconcilable contradiction be-
tween totality and difference, for Pannenberg himself there is no such con-
tradiction. Totality is not the negation of difference, but it is precisely the
actualisation of difference within a coherent semantic whole. Each finite
particularity receives its meaning from its place within the whole semantic
context. In this way, the totality functions as the ground and preservation
of creaturely differentiation: the finite particularities of temporal existence
receive their place and their identity from the eschatological totality of
God’s eternal kingdom.
This relationship between difference and totality is brought out clear-
ly in Pannenberg’s mature discussion of the final resurrection. The resur-
rection, he says, involves a removal of “individual autonomy and separa-
tion”, but not an “erasure of individual particularity”.101 Resurrected in-
dividuals are thus integrated and brought into harmony, so that they can
now “liv[e] out their finitude in its relation to the individuality of others”.102
The result, then, is not the elimination of finitude or of creaturely differen-
tiation, but a gathering up of all creatures into a harmonious interrelat-
edness which properly defines each creature and gives it its meaning. 
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Here in the closing section of Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology, the
recurring motif of his ontology is evident: in the eschatological totality,
each individual thing is established in its own place as a unique locus of the
manifestation of the totality. Pannenberg’s model, therefore, is not one of
totality at the expense of difference, but rather one of totality for the sake
of difference and of difference for the sake of totality. And it is certainly no
accident that Pannenberg’s own metaphor for this relationship between dif-
ference and totality is precisely the same as David Bentley Hart’s central
metaphor: that of music. At the eschatological consummation, the irre-
ducibly differentiated life of creation is brought together in a “many-voiced
harmony of the praise of God”.103
SUMMARY
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s eschatological ontology has been criticised for undermining the
goodness and reality of finite creaturely differentiation. Drawing on David Bentley Hart’s recent
ontological proposal, this article explores the critique of Pannenberg’s ontology, and offers a
defence of Pannenberg’s depiction of the relationship between difference and totality, especially
as it is presented in his 1988 work, Metaphysics and the Idea of God. In this work, Pannenberg
articulates a structured relationship between difference and totality in which individual finite
particularities are preserved and affirmed within a coherent semantic whole. Creaturely differen-
ces are not sublated or eliminated in the eschatological totality, but they are integrated into a har-
monious totality of meaning. This view of the semantic function of totality can be further
clarified by drawing an analogy between Pannenberg’s ontological vision and Robert W. Jenson’s
model of the eschatological consummation as a narrative conclusion to the drama of finite reality.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Wolfhart Pannenbergs eschatologische Ontologie wurde dafür kritisiert, dass sie den Wert
und die Realität endlicher kreatürlicher Unterscheidung unterwandere. Dieser Artikel stützt sich
auf David Bentley Harts aktuellen ontologischen Entwurf und untersucht die Kritik an Pannen-
bergs Ontologie. Dabei wird Pannenbergs Darstellung der Beziehung zwischen Unterschied und
Totalität, wie sie vor allem in seiner Arbeit von 1988, Metaphysik und Gottesgedanke, vorgestellt
wurde, verteidigt. Er beschreibt darin ein strukturiertes Verhältnis zwischen »Unterschied« und
»Totalität«, in dem einzelne, endliche Besonderheiten innerhalb eines schlüssig zusammenhän-
genden semantischen Ganzen bewahrt und bestätigt werden. Kreatürliche Unterschiede werden
in der eschatologischen Totalität nicht aufgehoben oder ausgesondert, sondern in ein harmoni-
sches Bedeutungsganzes integriert. Diese Sicht der semantischen Funktion der Totalität kann
noch deutlicher werden, wenn man eine Analogie zwischen Pannenbergs ontologische Vision und
Robert W. Jensons Modell der eschatologischen Vollendung als narrativem Ziel des Schauspiels
der endlichen Realität zieht.
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